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Comment
It Can’t Get That Ugly: Why Employers
Should Be Able to Take Aesthetics into
Consideration
By Thomas Pagliarini*
I. INTRODUCTION: SELLING MORE THAN JUST THE “BEST COFFEE IN
TOWN”

In the summer of 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) intensified an investigation into the
Marylou’s coffee chain on grounds that Marylou’s allegedly
discriminates against job applicants. In sum, seven charges were
filed against the chain. 1 Interestingly, the investigation was not
prompted by the filing of any complaints on the part of disgruntled
turned-down applicants, but rather, began from within the EEOC
itself as a “Commission-initiated investigation.” 2 The general
*Lord of Sealand; Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University
School of Law, 2014; B.A., Bryant University, 2011. I’d like to thank the
editors of the Law Review, especially Alyse Galoski and Maura Clancy for
their diligent editing of this Comment. Credit to Nick Nybo for something,
but mostly for the sake of symmetry. Lastly, to my parents, for everything.
1. Nicole Oliverio, Mary Lou’s Being Investigated for Discrimination,
WHDHNEWS.COM, May 24, 2012, http://www1.whdh.com/news
/articles/local/south/12007556046098/marylou-s-being-investigated-fordiscrimination/.
2. James McDonald, Here's Looking At You, Kid” - The EEOC Looks
For Beauty Bias, FISHER & PHILLIPS, L.L.P. ATTORNEYS AT LAW (July 2, 2012),
available at http://www.laborlawyers.com/19073.
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278 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:277
thrust behind the investigation was that Marylou’s, with its “pink”
branded image, only hires young attractive women for its barista
positions and that “it’s possible that applicants or employees
might not know that they have been discriminated against.” 3 In
conducting its investigation, the EEOC sifted through the
company’s job applications and interviewed employees about the
company’s work environment and the age, race, and even body
types of their fellow employees.
Boldly asserted on each cup of Marylou’s is that the company
serves the “Best Coffee in Town.” However, like all other food and
beverage service-based companies, Marylou’s undeniably is selling
more than just a simple food or beverage product. Indeed, when
founder Marylou Sandry opened her first Marylou’s coffee shop in
1986, she set out to build a business with a “friendly atmosphere”
that would be a “fun place to visit and work.” 4 In doing so, Sandry
sought to establish a particular brand, which—with over thirty
locations and counting—has been quite successful.5 Sandry
attributes the company’s success in large part to carefully
selecting “quality, dedicated people” from amongst its pool of
applicants.6 This careful selection process, Sandry believes, has
led to the creation of “a staff which has literally become famous,”
and stores that “specialize” not only in assorted pastries and a
“perfect coffee product,” but also “in happy faces or a smile and a
wink.” 7 Such fame, no doubt, spurred the interest of the EEOC,
whose investigation Sandry has described as a modern day “witch
hunt.” 8
While ultimately Marylou’s was cleared of all charges, 9 the
3. Id.
4. About Marylou’s, MARYLOU’S COFFEE, http://www.marylous.com
/about.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2013) (hereinafter “Marylou’s Coffee”).
5. Locations, MARYLOU’S COFFEE, http://www.marylous.com/
locations.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
6. Crystal Haynes, Former Employee Discusses Marylou’s Coffee
Culture, MYFOXBOSTON.COM (May 26, 2012), http://www.myfoxboston.com
/story/18633001/2012/05/26/former-employee-discusses-marylous-coffeeculture.
7. Marylou’s Coffee, supra note 4.
8. Federal Official Defends Discrimination Probe of Marylou’s Coffee
Shop Chain, PATRIOT LEDGER (June 8, 2012), http://www.patriotledger.com
/topstories/x1222854722/Feds-defend-probe-of-Marylou-s-coffee-shopchain#ixzz2KX1wSXMp [hereinafter Federal Official Defends].
9. Cara Kenefick, Marylou’s Cleared of Discrimination Charges,
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situation provides an opportunity to explore how courts and
scholars have addressed the complex nature of the role aesthetics
plays in Employment Law and what the future holds for
employers like Marylou’s.
Exploring the circumstances
surrounding the investigation into Marylou’s and other companies
will shed light on the logic (or lack thereof) of aesthetic- or
appearance-based employment discrimination claims.
Part I of this comment provides a discussion of the history of
aesthetic employment discrimination litigation and various
federal and state statutory proposals designed to protect against
such practices. 10 This section will demonstrate how employees, in
the absence of available legal protections for aesthetic
discrimination, have attempted to “fit” arguably aesthetic-based
claims into established frameworks for protected classes. 11
Part II argues why aesthetic discrimination claims should not
be allowed. Disallowing claims based on aesthetics would grant
employers much more control over their businesses and the
management of employees. Provided compliance with other
antidiscrimination laws, employers would be free to shape their
work environment in a manner best suited for their particular
business. 12 Additionally, expanding the availability of exceptions
NEWPORT PATCH (Oct., 25, 2012), http://newport.patch.com/articles/marylouscleared-of-discrimination-charges-fdc2113b. Sandry was able to happily say
that her company was cleared of all charges of discrimination when she
received a South Shore Women’s Business Network Business Achievement
Award in October of 2012. Id. Interestingly, in a Hingham Patch online
reader poll (though admittedly not scientific), readers answered the question
“Do You Think Marylou’s Hiring Practices are Prejudice/Sexist?” in the
negative by a margin of 67% (out of 49 votes). Tony Catinella, POLL: Do You
Think Marylou's Hiring Practices are Prejudice/Sexist?, HINGHAM PATCH
(May 31, 2012), http://hingham.patch.com/articles/do-you-think-marylou-shiring-practices-are-prejudice-sexist.
10. Mila Gumin, Note, Ugly on the Inside: An Argument for A Narrow
Interpretation of Employer Defenses to Appearance Discrimination, 96 MINN.
L. REV. 1769, 1773 (2012).
11. William R. Corbett, Hotness Discrimination: Appearance
Discrimination As A Mirror for Reflecting on the Body of EmploymentDiscrimination Law, 60 CATH. U.L. REV. 615, 633 (2011).
12. Alyssa Newcomb & Tanya Rivero, Melissa Nelson: Dental Assistant
Fired For Being “Irresistible” Is “Devastated,” ABCNEWS.COM (Dec. 23, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/12/melissa-nelson-dentalassistant-fired-for-being-irresistible-is-devastated/. Conversely, if aestheticbased discrimination claims were permitted, it would open the door for fullfledged reverse discrimination claims. Corbett, supra note 11, at 640. This
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to antidiscrimination laws based on bona fide occupational
qualification and business necessity for purely aesthetic purposes
would enable employers to fully deliver a holistic product of
“branded service.” 13 Part II further argues that aesthetics should
be considered a legitimate hiring criterion for all types of job
positions, not just those that historically “sell looks.”
Part III explains that although empowering employers to
shape their particular “branded service” based on aesthetics could
lend itself to certain potential abuses, employment discrimination
will not get that ugly. Desiring individuals with certain qualities
(e.g. naturally blonde hair, blue eyes) may inherently have a
disparate impact against certain protected classes under Title VII.
Similarly, unfettered deference to a particular employer’s
aesthetic preferences could be viewed as providing a backdoor way
to unlawfully discriminate against protected classes (e.g. an
employer’s personal aesthetic preference for a particular race).
However, by ensuring robust enforcement of the current statutory
and common law protections, an appropriate balance can be
struck that will be beneficial to both employees and employers.
PART I

A. EEOC’s Investigation into Marylou’s
The probe into Marylou’s hiring practices was part of what is
called a “Commission-initiated investigation.” 14 Generally, the
EEOC operates pursuant to its statutory authority by
investigating and pressing legal action in response to charges that
allege a pattern or practice of discrimination under various federal
statutes that are filed by a member of the EEOC or by an
aggrieved individual.15 However, the EEOC is also authorized to
would compound the unmanageable nature of finding a basis for aesthetic
discrimination claims. Would a complainant have to first prove whether it
would be preferable to be aesthetically more pleasing or less pleasing for the
particular position before filing a claim? See Newcomb and Rivero, supra
note 12.
13. Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual
Stereotyping, and the New Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
13, 18 (2007).
14. Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012–2016, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 8, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/
strategic_plan_12to16.pdf.
15. Id. The EEOC enforces the following federal laws: Title VII of the

PAGLIARINIFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

IT CAN’T GET THAT UGLY

3/2/2014 2:05 PM

281

initiate its own directed investigations under the Equal Pay Act of
1963 (“EPA”) and Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(“ADEA”), even in the absence of any charge or allegation of
discrimination.16 Through this device, the EEOC can initiate a
formal investigation against an employer, seek information and
data from the employer, and then ultimately file suit for any
violations of the statutes. 17 It appears that after a nearly yearlong investigation into Marylou’s, seven charges were filed against
the employer. 18 However, after scouring through the company’s
application materials and interviewing applicants that did not
gain employment, the EEOC ultimately dropped its charges. 19
Throughout the investigation, the EEOC adamantly insisted
that it was not trying to extend antidiscrimination protection to
encompass aesthetics. 20 In fact, as a matter of law, the EEOC
could not simply create an entirely new basis of employment
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), Section 501 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title I and Title V of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and the Genetic Information NonDiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”). Id. at 7.
16. Terrence H. Murphy & Marcy L. McGovern, The Scope of EEOC
Investigations, 2012 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. AND EMP. LAW 2, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2012/03/
national_conference_on_equal_employment_opportunity_law/mw2012eeo_mu
rphy.authcheckdam.pdf.
17. Id.
18. Oliverio, supra note 1. The article states that charges were filed “on
the behalf of people who weren’t hired.” Id. It appears that the charges that
were levied were by an EEOC Commissioner after former applicants were
tracked down and interviewed by the EEOC during its investigation. John
Zaremba, Feds Talk to Marylou’s Applicants, BOSTONHERALD.COM (June 7,
2012), http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_coverage/2012/06/
feds_talk_marylou%E2%80%99s_applicants. An EEOC spokesperson, Justine
Lisser, explained that Commissioner charges often arise out of information
gathered from victims who are too afraid to bring a charge on their own
behalf and that such “charges are not tools for fishing expeditions, but are
designed to institute an investigation of specific discriminatory practices.”
Mary Swanton, EEOC Investigates Coffee Chain for Barista Beauty Bias,
INSIDE COUNSEL (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com
/2012/08/23/eeoc-investigates-coffee-chain-for-barista-beauty.
19. Kenefick, supra note 9. Throughout, Sandry had asserted that she
was merely choosing the most qualified candidates from those that applied.
Id. Indeed, there is nothing discriminatory if certain groups are not
represented at a particular firm if there is no indication that they ever
applied for any positions.
20. Swanton, supra note 18.
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protection on its own, and there is currently no federal law that
prohibits discrimination on the basis of aesthetics alone.
However, the EEOC’s investigation into Marylou’s shares many
similarities with suits filed by individuals that have tried—with
varying degrees of success—to couch what were ostensibly
aesthetic discrimination arguments into established employment
discrimination frameworks.
B. Fitting Aesthetics In
In his latest piece on aesthetic employment discrimination,
Professor William R. Corbett provides an outline of various
examples of “fitting” within the aesthetic discrimination context.21
Fitting occurs when there is no explicit statutory or common law
basis for a particular claim, but in an effort to recover, an
employee pulls his or her case from the periphery to fall under, or
otherwise “fit,” an existing protected characteristic. 22 Corbett
argues that fitting is one of the common ways in which
employment discrimination law does—and he argues should—
operate for all types of claims. 23 He asserts that “fitting affords
courts some discretion in patrolling the fringes of employmentdiscrimination law,” which allows appropriate cases falling within
the penumbras of protected characteristics to obtain judicial
review. 24 Fitting compensates for the gaps in statutory protection,
which exist, in part, due to the difficulty in passing truly broad,
comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation. 25 Additionally, the
ability to fit claims serves as a check on employers from abusing
their power to discharge employees under an employment-at-will
regime.26
The multitude of factors that shape an individual’s overall
outward appearance make aesthetic-based cases susceptible to
attempts to fit claims under a wide range of discrimination
theories. Public sector employees have attempted to challenge
21. Corbett, supra note 11, at 633.
22. William R. Corbett, The Ugly Truth About Appearance
Discrimination and the Beauty of Our Employment Discrimination Law, 11
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 153, 158 (2007).
23. Corbett, supra note 11, at 639.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 639–40.
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grooming policies and dress code requirements under the
guarantee of liberty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.27 These attempts to garner
substantive due process protection for aesthetics have been largely
unsuccessful because courts scrutinize such challenges under the
heavy deference of rational basis review. 28 Courts have noted that
even if an employee has some type of constitutional interest in his
or her appearance generally, such an interest does not inherently
shelter the individual from the legitimate demands of employers
regarding their business and administrative judgment. 29
However, instead of trying to fit an aesthetic claim under the
amorphous and unpredictable protections of substantive due
process, employees can also fit an aesthetic claim under the
protections of Title VII. 30 For example, in Sadruddin v. City of
Newark, a Muslim firefighter challenged a regulation that
prohibited facial hair. 31 Despite the facial hair prohibition being
nearly identical to the regulation in Kelley 32 and the City of
Newark additionally asserting that the regulation was “necessary
to safely and effectively wear the self-contained breathing
apparatus (“SCBA”) used by Newark firefighters,” the court held
that the firefighter stated a prima facie religious discrimination
claim under Title VII. 33 The different outcomes in these cases
27. Stacey S. Baron, Note, (UN)Lawfully Beautiful: The Legal
(DE)Construction of Female Beauty, 46 B.C. L. REV. 359, 369–70 (2005). For
example, in Kelley v. Johnson, a police officer challenged the validity of a
county’s hair grooming regulation for male members of the police force. 425
U.S. 238, 239 (1976). The officer argued that the department’s facial hair
regulations violated his right of free expression under the First Amendment,
through the Due Process Clause, because the regulations were allegedly “not
based upon the generally accepted standard of grooming in the community”
and placed “‘an undue restriction’ upon his activities therein.” Id. at 240–41.
Finding that the desire to have uniformity in police officer appearance in
order to make officers more readily recognizable to the public and a desire to
build an esprit de corps were both rationally related to public safety, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the regulation. Id. at
248–49.
28. Baron, supra note 27, at 369–70.
29. Tardif v. Quinn, 545 F.2d 761, 763 (1st Cir. 1976).
30. Heather R. James, Note, If you are Attractive and You Know It,
Please Apply: Appearance Based Discrimination and Employer’s Discretion,
42 VAL. U. L. REV. 629, 649 (2008).
31. 34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 924 (D.N.J. 1999).
32. 425 U.S. at 239.
33. Sadruddin, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 924.
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lend support to the proposition that “not all employment
discrimination laws are equal, either when created or as applied
or developed.” 34
The varying degrees of successful fitting can often depend on
the immutability of the characteristic that is allegedly being
discriminated against.35 This is true even if the employee alleges
the specific characteristic’s historical and cultural value to a
particular race, or even a particular sex of members of that race.36
For example, in Rogers v. American Airlines, the court dismissed
the claims of female African-American employees alleging that a
grooming policy that prohibited the wearing of braided hair was
discriminatory against women and, in particular, black women.37
The court explained that “[a]n all-braided hair style is an ‘easily
changed characteristic,’ and, even if socioculturally associated
with a particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis
for distinctions in the application of employment practices by an
employer.” 38
Employees have also attempted to fit their claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act by asserting that being
unattractive or overweight is a disability. 39 In most cases where
employees allege discrimination because of obesity, the employees
are unsuccessful because they are unable to show the
requirements that their employer views them as impaired, that
34. Corbett, supra note 22, at 160. In fact, not even claims alleged under
the same antidiscrimination statute bear equal force. For example, in
Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, an employee asked for a reasonable
accommodation to an employer’s “no facial jewelry policy” because of her
religious beliefs as a practicing member of the Church of Body Modification.
390 F.3d 126, 128 (1st Cir. 2004). Despite this, the First Circuit held that the
employer had no duty to even accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs—
wearing facial jewelry—because forcing the company to do so would create an
“undue hardship.” Id.
35. Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Comment, Appearance Matters: A Proposal
to Prohibit Appearance Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195,
205–06 (2000).
36. Id.
37. 527 F. Supp. 229, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
38. Id. at 232. Contra EEOC Dec. No. 71-2444, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 18 (1971) (“[W]e note that the wearing of an Afro-American hair style
by a Negro has been so appropriated as a cultural symbol by members of the
Negro race as to make its suppression either an automatic badge of racial
prejudice or a necessary abridgement of first amendment rights.”).
39. Baron, supra note 27, at 375–76.
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their condition is caused by a physiological disorder, or that there
is a substantial limitation upon their life activities. 40
Additionally, some courts have addressed the practical
concerns of an employee’s weight and visual appearance in
regards to the particular position the employee is applying for.41
For example, in Goodman v. L.A. Weight Loss Centers, Inc., a 350pound man suffering from morbid obesity applied for a sales
counselor position.42 The employer was “a company that provides
weight reduction plans to clients, with an emphasis on one-on-one
coaching and maintenance of a healthy lifestyle.” 43 After an
initial interview, the interviewer explained to the applicant that,
although on paper she thought the applicant was the “most
qualified,” her manager expressed concerns about the applicant’s
weight. 44
Ultimately, the employer rejected the applicant
asserting that the organization “was an ‘image conscious’ company
and his weight would send the ‘wrong message’ to [the company’s]
overweight clientele.” 45 The court ultimately dismissed the
applicant’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. 46 Explaining its rationale, the court stated that:
it is well established that an employer is permitted to
make hiring decisions based on certain physical
characteristics. The mere fact that Defendant was aware
of Plaintiff’s weight and rejected his application for fear
that his appearance did not accord with the company
image is not improper. To hold otherwise would render an
employer’s ability to hire based on certain physical
characteristics entirely void.47
The court explained that it was not as though the employer
perceived the applicant as being “substantially limited in the
performance of a wide range of work-related tasks or varying
40. Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV.
1033, 1080 (2009).
41. Corbett, supra note 22, at 164.
42. Goodman v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., No. 04-CV-3471, 2005 WL
241180, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2005).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at *3.
47. Id. at *3 (emphasis added).
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positions.” 48 Rather, it was because, in the employer’s belief, the
applicant’s obese appearance “was manifestly inconsistent with
the product it was trying to sell.” 49
While attempts to fit aesthetic claims arise from a variety of
angles, the ones that receive a vast amount of the attention of
courts and commentators—and those most relevant to
Marylou’s—are those that are fit under sex (and sexual
harassment) and gender-stereotype discrimination claims. 50 One
type of sex discrimination claim involving aesthetics is dress and
grooming standards. Very often, there will in fact be different
dress and grooming standards for men and women. 51 Indeed,
employers’ policies may distinguish between men and women that
may be based somewhat on conventional societal norms.52
However, in establishing different criteria for men and women,
the purported standards must place an equal burden on each of
the sexes.53 For example, in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.,
Inc., the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of a casino’s grooming
policy that set different specific requirements for men and women
regarding how each employee’s hair, hands, and face must
appear. 54 Despite the policy’s requirement that women—and only
women—must wear makeup, and the female employee’s assertion
48. Id. However, in Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health,
Retardation & Hospitals, the First Circuit upheld a jury verdict for an
employee that claimed she was refused employment because the employer
perceived her obesity as a disability. 10 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 1993). The
court stated that the employee could recover under a perceived disability
theory by “demonstrating that she was treated as if she had an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity.” Id. at 25. Additionally, in
addressing immutability, the court found that “the jury reasonably could
have inferred that [the employer] regarded plaintiff's morbid obesity as an
‘impairment of a continuing nature.’” Id. at 24. In contrast, in Goodman, the
employer acknowledged it believed the applicant could lose the requisite
weight and even encouraged him to reapply at that point. Goodman, 2005
WL 241180, at *2.
49. Goodman, 2005 WL 241180, at *8.
50. Mary Nell Trautner & Samantha Kwan, Gendered Appearance
Norms: An Analysis of Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 1970–2008, 20
RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK 127, 135 (2010) (stating that 118 out of
201, or 58.7% of appearance discrimination cases from 1970 to 2008 involved
some type of allegation of discrimination on the basis of sex).
51. Corbett, supra note 11, at 633.
52. Adamitis, supra note 35, at 208.
53. Corbett, supra note 11, at 634.
54. 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006).
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of the added, unreimbursed cost and time associated with such
application, the court found that the policy did not impose an
unequal burden on men and women.55
While moderate leeway may be afforded to employers with
regard to differentiation in grooming policies, employees can still
fit an aesthetic claim under sex discrimination if the employer’s
actions impose an impermissible gender stereotype. 56 For
example, in Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America., L.L.C., a hotel
clerk, who was generally considered a good employee by her
immediate supervisor, was fired by the hotel’s director of
operations because the clerk did not have a “Midwestern girl
look.” 57 The plaintiff asserted that the employer had created a “de
facto requirement that a female employee conform to gender
stereotypes.” 58 The court noted that the particular job description
in the company’s personnel manual did not mention appearance
and, in reversing summary judgment, held that there was
evidence that the employer could have discharged the employee
based on a gender stereotype that is arguably inherent in seeking
an individual to comport with the “sex-specific and derogatory
term[ ]” “[m]idwestern girl look.” 59
Further, if employers become remiss in their duties to protect
employees and maintain the proper degree of professionalism,
employees may be able to assert sexual harassment claims. 60 An
employer may be liable for tangible action harassment (or quid
pro quo), when “submission to or rejection of [unwelcome sexual]
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment

55. Id. at 1110.
56. Corbett, supra note 11, at 635. The seminal gender stereotype case
is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). In
Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff was an associate at an accounting firm who
alleged she was denied partnership on the basis of sex. Id. at 232. It was
found that, among other comments, one partner advised that in order to
improve her chances of becoming a partner, the plaintiff should learn to
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.” Id. at 235.
57. 591 F.3d 1033, 1036 (8th Cir. 2010).
58. Id. at 1037.
59. Id. at 1040–41.
60. Sharon Stiller, An employer is liable under Title VII to an employee
for a hostile environment created by a supervisor, PRAC. INSIGHTS EMP. NY
0060 (2013).
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decisions affecting such individual.” 61 An employer may also be
liable for sexual harassment if “bothersome attentions or sexual
remarks [become] sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a
hostile work environment.” 62 Additionally, an employer can be
liable for sexual harassment committed by non-employees when
the employer, as a condition of employment, has put the employee
in a position which subjects the employee to sexual harassment.63
For example, in EEOC v. Sage Realty Corporation, a female
attendant was forced to wear a poncho uniform that exposed parts
of her thighs and buttocks. 64 As a result of wearing the uniform,
the employee was subjected to sexual propositions and lewd
comments and gestures from non-employees. 65 The employee
reported such behavior to her supervisors, refused to wear the
uniform any longer, and was subsequently discharged.66 The
employee sued for sexual harassment and the district court
agreed, finding that the employer had violated Title VII by
requiring the employee “to wear, as a condition of her
employment, a uniform that was revealing and sexually
provocative and could reasonably be expected to subject her to
sexual harassment when worn on the job and a uniform [the
employers] knew did subject her to such harassment.” 67
PART II

A. The Formation of an Antidiscrimination Law
Many of the scholars and commentators that have addressed
aesthetic discrimination have advocated for the need to create an
aesthetic antidiscrimination law or to expand some of the existing

61. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1993)). For example, in Karibian the court
reversed summary judgment for the employer, because the employee claimed
that her direct supervisor threatened to fire her if she did not comply with
the supervisor’s demands for a sexual relationship. Id. at 779.
62. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998).
63. Robert Aalberts & Lorne Seidman, Sexual Harassment of Employees
by Non-Employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable, 21 PEPP. L. REV.
447, 451 (1994).
64. 507 F. Supp. 599, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
65. Id. at 605.
66. Id. at 606–08.
67. Id. at 608.
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antidiscrimination laws to cover aesthetic-based claims.68
Standing in contrast to many of these writers, Professor Corbett
has stated his belief that an “appearance-based discrimination law
will not be passed” and further opining that “it is good that it will
not.” 69 Utilizing analytical factors put forth by previous scholars
regarding what leads to the development of an antidiscrimination
law, Corbett discusses why support for an aesthetic
antidiscrimination law is, and likely will always be, lacking. 70 He
suggests the following factors are critical to the development of an
antidiscrimination law: (1) moral objection to the type of
discrimination; (2) a cohesive and identifiable group of people that
would be covered; (3) a history of discrimination against those who
have the characteristic; (4) immutability of the characteristic; and
(5) irrelevance of the characteristic to job performance.71
In each of these factors, aesthetics generally tends to
resemble what Corbett considers the weakest of the
antidiscrimination laws for that particular factor. 72 Regarding
moral qualms about aesthetic discrimination, Corbett posits that
while most may find intentional discrimination based on
68. See Gumin, supra note 10, at 1793–94; Rhode, supra note 40, at
1048; Karen Zakrzewski, Comment, The Prevalence of “Look”ism in Hiring
Decisions: How Federal Law Should be Amended to Prevent Appearance
Discrimination in the Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 431, 432 (2005);
Adamitis, supra note 35, at 195.
69. Corbett, supra note 22, at 161. While this statement is seemingly
clear on its face, Corbett’s position, at least what is gleaned from his pieces on
aesthetic discrimination observed as a whole, does not necessarily take on an
advocacy perspective. See id. at 160–161; see also Corbett, supra note 11, at
626. Further, it should also be acknowledged that while Corbett may provide
one of the clearest statements regarding his view on why there will not be
some type of federal aesthetic antidiscrimination statute, other writers have
addressed the need to provide employers with certain devices to protect
themselves against aesthetic-based claims. See James, supra note 30, at
672–73; see also Lynn T. Vo, Comment, A More Attractive Look at Physical
Appearance-Based Discrimination: Filling the Gap in Appearance AntiDiscrimination Law, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339, 357-58 (2002). These works are
also significant, because in addition to containing some employer-deferential
proposals, but also since they highlight that such views transcend gender.
70. Corbett, supra note 22, at 171.
71. Id. (citing Peggy R. Smith, Parental-Status Employment
Discrimination: A Wrong in Need of a Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569,
601 (2002)). Additionally, Corbett notes that generally there will need to be
“sufficient political clout” in order to have a piece of legislation passed. Id.
72. Id. at 171–76.

PAGLIARINIFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/2/2014 2:05 PM

290 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 19:277
aesthetics to be somewhat morally disconcerting, such avulsion is
not as severe as that which is associated with racial
discrimination.73 Additionally, moral objections are closely tied to
societal conceptions of immutability; when the particular aesthetic
feature is more easily improved, society may have less objection to
discrimination regarding that feature.74
Just as a particular aesthetic feature is subject to change,
there would be even greater difficulty trying to pin down a
discernible, cohesive group to protect against aesthetic
discrimination.75 The timeless expression “beauty is in the eye of
the beholder” succinctly highlights the subjectivity that would
inherently plague aesthetic discrimination claims. 76 Unlike some
of the more traditional protected classes (e.g., race or color), which
provide a more objective basis for determining members of the
particular class, there is no truly objective mechanism to
determine if an individual would be a member of an “unattractive”
or “not aesthetically pleasing” class. 77 Likewise, while there may
be an array of anecdotes suggesting the enduring ills of aesthetic
discrimination, the amorphous nature of such features and
characteristics may make it difficult to document a truly
comprehensive history of discrimination. 78
Even adamant supporters of the need to protect against
aesthetic discrimination recognize that “[p]art of the problem is
that attractiveness and grooming standards fall along a
continuum,” and are left pondering, “[h]ow would employers or
courts determine what aspects of appearance are entitled to
protection?” 79 A provocative, yet illuminating query posed by one
prominent labor attorney is “[w]ill there be a national standard of
73. Id. at 173.
74. Id. at 173, 175.
75. Id. at 173–74.
76. Corbett, supra note 11, at 627–28. Conversely, due to the stigma
that is allegedly attached to being unattractive, individuals may not be so
willing to come forward and assert that they believe they were fired because
they are unattractive. Id. Rhode, supra note 40, at 1069. However, to save
face—quite literally—proud individuals could assert some type of perceived
unattractive theory, similar to the perceived disability theory. See Cook v.
Rhode Island, Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 26
(1st Cir. 1993).
77. Corbett, supra note 22, at 173–74.
78. Id. at 175.
79. Rhode, supra note 40, at 1068.
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attractiveness established by EEOC rulemaking?” 80
The last factor, irrelevance to work, necessitates further
discussion because of its particular significance in the role of
aesthetic discrimination discussions. Corbett asserts that the
“perceived irrelevance of a characteristic to work is one of the
most complex elements in employment discrimination law.” 81 The
relevance of aesthetics in employment, Corbett correctly
acknowledges, “depends on the job and how you define it.” 82
Indeed, this framing issue is of critical significance. However, I
argue that many courts and commentators have largely distorted
the proper role that aesthetics should play in the employment and
business context.
B. The Historical Mind–Body Dichotomy
“In an ideal world, no aspect of appearance would be
considered in employment matters.” 83
If the above statement represents the “ideal world” for
proponents of an aesthetic antidiscrimination law, then it follows
that their dystopia would be a world where “[p]eople will compete
for jobs not based on substantive factors, but on how attractive
they are.” 84 Society would become so increasingly concerned with
looks and would eventually hit rock bottom as “[a]ttractiveness
[would] be looked at as an accomplishment in itself.” 85
Proponents of an aesthetic antidiscrimination law argue that
“for most jobs appearance has no bearing on an individual’s ability
80. Id. (quoting James J. McDonald Jr., Civil Rights for the
Aesthetically-Challenged, 29 EMP. REL. L.J. 118, 127 (2003)).
81. Corbett, supra note 22, at 175–76.
82. Id.
83. Adamitis, supra note 35, at 221.
84. Zakrzewski, supra note 68, at 434. Absolutely no disrespect is
intended by my use of Attorney Zakrzewski’s language. The hypothetical
uber-aestheticized “dystopia” is merely used as a device to provoke thought
and stimulate a dialogue about the role of aesthetics in the our society
generally, and in the employment context more specifically.
85. Id.; but see PLATO, COMPLETE WORKS 493 (John M. Cooper & D. S.
Hutchinson eds. 1997) (“the beauty of bodies is a thing of no importance.”);
Proverbs 4:7 (King James) (“Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore get
wisdom.”); SOPHOCLES, THE PLAYS AND FRAGMENTS, PART III: THE ANTIGONE
237 (Sir Richard Jebb trans., Cambridge University Press, ed., 1900) (440
B.C.) (“Wisdom is the supreme part of happiness.”).
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to perform.” 86 By providing aesthetics with heightened scrutiny,
an aesthetic antidiscrimination law could serve the goal of
“break[ing] down and challeng[ing] the historic value placed on []
physical attractiveness.” 87
In doing so, proponents hope,
“[e]mployers would be encouraged to hire applicants based solely
on legitimate qualifications and business concerns, instead of on
stereotypical and unfounded assumptions.” 88
This view, exaggerated by the hypothetical dystopia, shows
that many commentators marginalize the notion that aesthetics
has a legitimate value. However, even some of the staunchest
advocates for aesthetic antidiscrimination protection acknowledge
that in some employment contexts, such as “modeling, acting, or
sexual entertainment,” aesthetics plays an “essential” role. 89 Yet,
at times, even the slightest movement from what these proponents
see as essential appearance-based jobs renders, in their view, the
value of appearance to a nullity.90 For example, one commentator
argues that there is a distinct difference between “businesses that
sell looks exclusively” and the restaurant server that is just
supposed to serve food; the fitness instructor whose “primary
purpose . . . is to instruct students on fitness moves and routines
and ensure the health of all students, not to provide a ‘gaze object’
for students;” and retail clothing associates that are “primarily
expected to provide customer service, ring up sales and keep the
store displays neat and organized.” 91
In like turn, however, the same splicing of job functions can
be done for the model, the actor, and the sexual entertainer as
well. It is the model’s job “to display, advertise and promote
commercial products (notably fashion clothing).” 92 An actor’s job
is to “interpret[] a dramatic character” and connect with an
Indeed, even a stripper can justifiably be
audience.93
characterized as a “professional,” and one whose job is to render a
86. Adamitis, supra note 35, at 195; see Gumin, supra note 10, at 1770.
87. Baron, supra note 27, at 387.
88. Adamitis, supra note 35, at 212.
89. Rhode, supra note 40, at 1065.
90. Gumin, supra note 10, at 1791–92.
91. Id.
92. “Model (Profession)” WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_
(profession)#cite_note-1.
93. “Actor” WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Actor. See also,
“Pornographic Film Actor” WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porn_star.
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“performance” that entices customers. 94
Such splicing appears to be done at the margins of many
customer service-based jobs where the determination to be made
is “whether the employer is primarily in the business of selling
‘sex’ or is using sexual allure to market other services and
products.” 95 It is in these high-contact customer service positions
that companies will often attempt to establish aesthetic standards
or implement company-wide grooming policies.96 However, issues
with aesthetic discrimination claims and attempts to impose
aesthetic standards no doubt can permeate into non-customer
service and other professional, behind-the-scene positions as
well. 97 Yet, whereas aesthetic discrimination may perhaps be
somewhat tolerated in the former job categories, the notion of
discriminating on the basis of aesthetics in the latter job
categories stirs up much more controversy. 98
Nevertheless, what often gets overlooked by trying to impose
such a strict dichotomy of job classifications is that aesthetics may
be a legitimate criterion upon which to base employment decisions
throughout all job types.99 Indeed, while commentators are quick
to scorn the “stereotypical and unfounded assumptions,” which
lead to “arbitrary, irrational, and unfair” hiring decisions made
based on aesthetics, there is little acknowledgement that all
hiring decisions are made on inherently improvable assumptions
that bear varying degrees of success. 100 Employers, like every
other actor, make decisions in a state of inherent uncertainty.101
94. “Stripper” WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stripper#
Performance; see also “Prostitution” WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Prostitute.
95. Avery & Crain, supra note 13, at 44.
96. Rhode, supra note 40, at 1064.
97. Corbett, supra note 11, at 621–22.
98. Avery and Crain describe this as the difference between selling sex
and using sex (to allure customers). Avery & Crain, supra note 13, at 44.
99. Timothy A. Judge, Charlice Hurst, and Lauren S. Simon, Does it Pay
to be Smart, Attractive, or Confident (or all Three)? Relationships Among
General Mental Ability, Physical Attractiveness, Core Self-Evaluations, and
Income, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 742, 751 (2009).
100. Adamitis, supra note 35, at 212.
101. The concept of “Bounded Rationality” was developed by the
economist Hebert Simon to describe the reality that actors are constrained
from making completely rational decisions because their decision
environment is too complex (too much information) in relation to the actor’s
mental and computational abilities (unable to process) and the lack of enough
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To compensate, decision makers rely on certain rules of thumb
and other heuristics to guide their thought processes. 102 For
example, in the employment context, an individual’s résumé is
used as the key starting point in the hiring process. 103 Armed
with nothing but a candidate’s résumé by itself, employers often
make an initial—and perhaps even at times final—determination
of whether the candidate fits with “the demands of the job
vacancy” and the values of the organization. 104 Thus, in a way,
the résumé provides a rule of thumb to guide an uncertain
employment decision.105 The rule of thumb operates on both
sides: the candidate appeals to it by trying to convey that he or
she will be able to perform competently and the employer makes a
decision in hopes that a desirable feature will translate into
competent performance. Acknowledging this is by no means an
attack on the use of résumés in the hiring process. 106 Rather, it is
just to highlight that, in the end, whatever the hiring decision to
be made, it will rely on assumptions regarding competency that
cannot be proven until after the fact. 107
time. David Dequech, Bounded Rationality, Institutions, and Uncertainty, 35
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES 911, 912–13 (2001).
102. Id. at 920.
103. Wei-Chi Tsai et al., The Effects of Applicant Résumé Contents on
Recruiters’ Hiring Recommendations: The Mediating Roles of Recruiter Fit
Perceptions, 60 APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 231, 231
(2001).
104. Id. at 232.
105. The same holds true for certain characteristics and behaviors that
are exhibited during an interview, a process which is also replete with its
own problems of uncertainty. See Marc-André Reinhard, Martin Scharmach,
and Patrick Müller, It’s not what you are, it’s what you know: experience,
beliefs, and the detection of deception in employment interviews, JOURNAL OF
APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 10 (2013) (finding that sample including high
percentage of experienced hiring professionals were only slightly above
chance at discerning lies and truths).
106. Cf. John Sullivan, What’s Wrong With Using Resumes For Hiring?
Pretty Much Everything, ERE.NET (July 16, 2012 5:16 AM), available at
http://www.ere.net/2012/07/16/what%E2%80%99s-wrong-with-usingresumes-for-hiring-pretty-much-everything/. Even elite law firm employers
make decisions based on heuristics that they think will aid their firm.
William D. Henderson, The Bursting of the Pedigree Bubble, 21 NALP
BULLETIN 1, 12 (2009).
107. This is just an example of the discussions in philosophy regarding a
priori versus a posteriori knowledge. See A Priori and A Posteriori, INTERNET
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/apriori/.
The argument can be made that a resume reflects competency by
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However, when an employer makes a hiring decision based on
the information displayed on a résumé 108 or a response given to an
interview question, the decision is not inherently fraught with
controversy. Rather, the decision engenders notions of rationality
and legitimacy by relying on what is considered socially acceptable
evaluative criteria. 109 To hire a mega-firm, Ivy-league educated
attorney to handle a sophisticated business transaction or high
stakes litigation is deemed a professional, sensible decision, while
staffing a restaurant with beautiful, busty women or handsome,
hard-bodied men appears crude.110 This reality highlights that
many commentators perpetuate a classic mind–body dichotomy
that has characterized much of Western thought. 111 Whereas
things typically associated with the mind, like past academic
performance, are viewed as something noble and praiseworthy,
things associated with the body, like aesthetics, are not held in the
same esteem.112 Discriminating on the basis of mental capacity is
justified, while “discrimination based on appearance is a
significant form of injustice.” 113 Put simply, it is permissible for
an employer not to hire an individual because the employer thinks
the candidate is stupid, but it is wrong not to hire an individual
because the employer thinks the candidate is ugly. But why?
Proponents of aesthetic antidiscrimination laws argue it is a
“significant form of injustice” that attractive individuals may

highlighting past performance, which should be indicative of future
competence. However, in the end, past performance does not guarantee
future success and the decision is guided—at best—by probability.
108. Assuming the decision is not driven by antiracial or antiethnic
animus. See Eva Derous & Ann Marie Ryan, Documenting the Adverse
Impact of Résumé Screening: Degree of Ethnic Identification Matters, 20
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SELECTION AND ASSESSMENT 464, 472 (2012).
109. See Adamitis, supra note 35, at 221.
110. Gumin, supra note 10, at 1769 (“Why should Hooters be allowed to
decide what their employees should look like . . . ?”)
111. Steven D. Edwards, The Body as Object Versus the Body as Subject:
The Case of disability, 1 MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE AND PHILOSOPHY 47, 47
(1998).
112. See PLATO, supra note 85, at 493 (“the beauty of bodies is a thing of
no importance.”); Gumin, supra note 10, at 1774 (“Instead of focusing on a
person’s intellectual merits and accomplishments, employers who hire based
on the positive characteristics they associate with an attractive appearance
are less likely to hire the best candidate.”).
113. Rhode, supra note 40, at 1035.
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receive preferential treatment and other benefits. 114 They suggest
that such unfairness manifests itself from a very early age,
pointing out that teachers and parents give more attention to
attractive individuals and that, later on in life, attractive
individuals are more likely to be hired, promoted, and earn larger
salaries than less attractive individuals. 115 However, as Harvard
economist Robert Barro notes: “[O]utcomes based on intelligence
are clearly unfair in the sense that, by and large, smarter people
end up richer, and being smart is to a considerable extent a
matter of luck.” 116 Additionally, the same “unfair” early
preferential treatment holds true for intelligent children as
well. 117 Due to the increased ease with which an intelligent child
acquires education and learning skills, they are more likely “to
receive psychosocial and instrumental support” from teachers
than less intelligent students.118
C. Aesthetics as a Legitimate Hiring Criterion
Many of the same reasons that commentators highlight to
assert the unfairness created by preferential treatment for
aesthetically-pleasing individuals actually work to validate the
legitimacy of aesthetics as a legitimate employment criterion.
Generally speaking—and commentators around agree—an
individual’s visual appearance is the first thing another will
notice. 119 This noticing of another’s appearance, it is argued,
“overpowers other personal characteristics in any interaction of
first impression.” 120 The first impression, and subsequent
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1037–39.
116. Robert J. Barro, So You Want to Hire the Beautiful. Well, Why Not?,
BUS. WK., Mar. 16, 1998, at 18. Barro suggests—in not so many words—that
for the most part we all are subject to an extent to make do with the
proverbial cards we are dealt from above. See id.
117. See Judge et. al, supra note 99, at 744.
118. Id. (citing S.J. Ceci & W. M. Williams, Schooling, Intelligence, and
Income, 52 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, 1051–58 (1997)).
119. See, e.g. Zakrzewski, supra note 68, at 432. A key assumption
running through these various analyzes is that the vast majority of
individuals do not suffer from an uncorrected visual impairment.
120. Baron, supra note 27, at 364 (citing David L. Wiley, Beauty and the
Beast: Physical Appearance Discrimination in American Criminal Trials, 27
ST. MARY'S L.J. 193, 201–03 (1995) (Wiley’s work discusses more in depth the
social psychology theory of attribution that suggests individuals render

PAGLIARINIFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

IT CAN’T GET THAT UGLY

3/2/2014 2:05 PM

297

observations of another individual, drive one’s evaluation of that
individual’s
characteristics. 121
Research
suggests
that
“[a]ttractiveness corresponds with attributes such as virtue,
integrity, intelligence, sensitivity, kindness, and honesty.” 122
While these studies suggest a positive correlation between
one’s perceived attractiveness and the observer’s likelihood of
attributing positive characteristics, there is also the possibility
that this perception can, in turn, foster that particular
characteristic in the individual. 123 The research suggests that the
positive characteristics that are associated with attractiveness can
undergo an “expectancy confirmation.” 124 Through this process,
after “stereotypes regarding attractiveness elicit expectations that
lead to consistently differential judgment and treatment[,] [t]hese
outcomes are then internalized and cause development of
differential behavior, traits, and self views.” 125
Additionally, to the extent that one’s perception of another
drives the social interaction between the two individuals, that
perception becomes a tangible reality.
For example,
attractiveness can potentially make someone a more capable
leader.126 In fact, the very notion of one whose leadership
capabilities are driven by charisma speaks to this point. 127 As
judgment regarding a person’s personality and other characteristics based on
inferences drawn from the other individual’s appearance).
121. Baron, supra note 27, at 364.
122. Adamitis, supra note 35, at 197 (citing GORDON L. PATZER, THE
PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS PHENOMENA 1, 8 (Plenum Press 1985) and Meg
Gehrke, Is Beauty the Beast?, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 221, 230–32
(1994)).
123. See Judge et. al, supra note 99, at 742.
124. Id. (citing J.H. Langlois, From the Eye of the Beholder to Behavioral
Reality: Physical Attractiveness, In 3 PHYSICAL APPEARANCE, STIGMA, AND
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 23–51 (C.P. Herman, M.P. Zanna,
& E.T. Higgins Eds. 1986); J.H. Langlois, et. al, Maxims or myths of beauty?
A meta-analytic and theoretical review, 126 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 390–
423 (2000)).
125. Id. (citing J. M. Darley & R. H. Fazio, Expectancy Confirmation
Processes Arising in the Social Interaction Sequence, 35 AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGIST 867–881 (1980)) (emphasis added).
126. Judge et. al, supra note 99, at 750.
127. See Charisma Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/charisma (last visited Oct. 14, 2013)
(“1: a personal magic of leadership arousing special popular loyalty or
enthusiasm for a public figure (as a political leader) 2: a special magnetic
charm or appeal.”).
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Timothy Judge and his colleagues explain, “attractive people tend
to be higher in extraversion, which is positively associated with
transformational leadership behaviors.” 128 Further, they assert:
[i]mplicit leadership theory argues that people develop
schemas of characteristics that indicate an effective
leader. Individuals characterized and evaluated as
leaders to the extent that they are prototypical of others’
schemas.
In addition to being more extraverted,
attractive people tend to be seen as higher in intelligence,
although the actual correlation between attractiveness
and intelligence is negligible. Perceptual measures of
intelligence are more positively related to leader
emergence than paper-and-pencil measures, indicating
that those who are seen as intelligent are more likely to
become leaders. Attractive people are also viewed as less
self-serving when engaging in efforts to wield influence
over others which suggests that people would be more
receptive to their attempts to attain leadership
positions. 129
Likewise, to the extent that individuals are more likely to respond
positively in interactions with more attractive people, the value of
attractiveness may rise in work environments that are
increasingly dominated by work teams. 130
The point is—as many commentators acknowledge—
aesthetics matters. From a practical perspective, many employers
already acknowledge this fact. 131 Yet, instead of trying to
artificially parse out job qualifications to determine when
aesthetics is and is not a bona fide occupational qualification

128. Judge et. al, supra note 99, at 750 (internal citations omitted).
129. Id. (internal citations omitted).
130. See Michael Boyer O’Leary, Mark Mortensen, & Anita Woolley,
Multiple Team Membership: A Theoretical Model of Its Effects on Productivity
and Learning for Individuals, Teams, MIT SLOAN SCHOOL WORKING PAPER
4752-09, at 2 (discussing the proliferation of workers who are members of
multiple teams).
131. Adamitis, supra note 35, at 195 (“One survey of interviewers found
appearance to be the single most important factor in employee selection for a
wide variety of jobs”) (citing Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending
Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical
Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2040 (1987)).
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(BFOQ) 132—a task that could very quickly lead to reductio ad
absurdum133—a more holistic view of an employee should be
adopted. 134 In addition to what commentators refer to as “actual
qualifications,” such as “a person’s intellectual merits” 135 and
their “academic, career [and] personal accomplishments,”136
employers should be able to take into consideration the value the
employee can add because of the individual’s aesthetic appeal.
For example, many commentators cite a study that showed more
attractive attorneys make more money than less attractive

132. A bona fide occupational qualification defense is an affirmative
defense that an employer can raise after a plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case of discrimination under Title VII or the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)
(2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e). The ADEA states that “[i]t shall not be
unlawful for an employer . . . to take any action otherwise prohibited . . .
where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Title
VII provides that “it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or
national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e–2(e). Under the current framework, the court, not the employer
defines the essence of the employer’s business and then determines if the
discrimination is justified as being “reasonably necessary to the essence of his
business.” W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985). An
employer can prove this necessity by showing it has “reasonable cause to
believe” that “all or substantially all” of the discriminated group “would be
unable to perform . . . the duties of the job involved,” or that the
discrimination served as a “legitimate proxy for the [ ] job qualifications . . .
and that it is ‘impossible or highly impractical’ to deal with the [ ] employees
on an individualized basis.” Id. at 414. Note however, that under the current
state of the law, an employer would not necessarily have to resort to a BFOQ
for a pure aesthetic-based claim because discrimination on the basis of
aesthetics is not a protected class under federal law. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §
623(f)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e).
133. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text.
134. See Avery & Crain, supra note 13, at 19. Avery and Crain discuss
the use of “branded service,” which is “the process of integrating the business
image into the service itself through human resource policies.” Id. One
method of delivering “branded service” is through the “ ‘transformation’ or
‘empowerment’ approach, [which] confers control over the work process by
transforming the working into one whose personal characteristics,
appearance, and values match the image that the company is seeking to
project and market.” Id. at 20.
135. Gumin, supra note 10, at 1774.
136. Zakrzewski, supra note 68, at 434.
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classmates.137 As the study suggests, even an attorney may be
able to be more productive by being able to—quite literally—
attract clients to a firm. 138
While many argue against employers being able to extract
value from an employee’s aesthetics, it is interesting to note that
aesthetics is similar to “soft skills, a term used by economic
sociologists to refer to the personality, attitude, and behavior
requirements for employment in service sector jobs” and to
“‘emotional labor,’ which refers to aspects of jobs that require
workers to enact particular emotional states in order to
manipulate clients or customers.” 139 Aesthetics, soft skills, and
emotional labor each generally involve highly subjective
assessments of value, “focus on the embodied characteristics of
workers,” 140
and
were
originally
“unrecognized
and
However, unlike
uncompensated” in the labor market. 141
aesthetics, now “[m]uch of the sociological literature on emotional
labor has argued for [soft skills and emotional labor’s] recognition
and compensation.” 142 In fact, many employers now go to great
lengths to nurture and develop the benefits of emotional labor for
its benefit to the overall successful operation of a firm. 143 While
the notions of soft skills and emotional labor may have their
origins in prototypical customer service industry positions, both
are now sought-after commodities across much of the labor
force. 144
While aesthetics may play a powerful implicit role in the
employment context, it is time for that role to be legitimized.
There are few—if any—individuals that would argue that the link
137. Adamitis, supra note 35, 195 (citing Jeff Biddle & Daniel
Hamermesh, Beauty, Productivity and Discrimination: Lawyers’ Looks and
Lucre, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 172, 185–90 (1998)).
138. Id. at 198.
139. Christine L. Williams & Catherine Connell, “Looking Good and
Sounding Right”: Aesthetic Labor and Social Inequality in the Retail
Industry, 37 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 349, 352 (2010) (emphasis in original).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 372.
142. Id. (citing NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND
FAMILY VALUES (New Press 2001)).
143. See, e.g., SENN DELANEY, THE HUMAN OPERATING SYSTEM: AN OWNER’S
MANUAL (2011) (workbook used by a leading human capital consulting firm).
144. See, client list, SENN DELANEY 9 (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) , available
at http://www.senndelaney.com/client_list.html.
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between increased intelligence and higher wages should be
severed.145 Indeed, people can generally recognize the value and
efficiency of allocating brainpower to its more productive uses.146
As Barro asserts, however: “The same reasoning applies to
physical appearance . . . it makes no sense to say that basing
employment and wages on physical appearance is a form of
discrimination, whereas basing them on intelligence is not. The
two cases are fundamentally the same.” 147 Essentially, just as
occurs for intelligence, “the market will generate a premium for
beauty based on the values that customers and co-workers place
on physical appearance in various fields.” 148 Like all employment
relationships, the varying premiums generated by aesthetics will
allow an attractive individual to demand a higher wage in
particular areas (labor cost) and will also allow employers to
capitalize on the surplus value that an attractive employee
generates in excess of the labor cost.149 Thus, a holistic view of
labor—one that takes into consideration all of an employee’s
desirable characteristic—can inure to the benefit of both an
employee and an employer. 150
Instead of having courts try to define what is the essence of
an employer’s business for the purposes of a “business necessity”
defense 151—that is, when a business “sell[s] looks exclusively” 152—
145. See Barro, supra note 116, at 18.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See Stavros Mavroudeas & Alexis Ioannides, Duration, Intensity and
Productivity of Labour and the Distinction between Absolute and Relative
Surplus-value, 23 REVIEW OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 421, 421 (2011).
150. See Avery & Crain, supra note 13, at 31.
151. An employer can raise a business necessity defense against a
disparate impact claim by showing that the “challenged practice is job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e–2. Citing the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
the Supreme Court has affirmed that the “‘touchstone’ for disparate-impact
liability is the lack of ‘business necessity,’” that is, the “employment practice .
. . cannot be shown to be related to job performance.” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557
U.S. 557, 578 (2009) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)). Further, as is the case with BFOQ, under the current state of the
law, an employer would not necessarily have to resort to a business necessity
defense for a pure aesthetic-based claim because discrimination on the basis
of aesthetics is not a protected class under federal law. See supra note 132
and accompanying text.
152. Gumin, supra note 10, at 1771.
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courts should apply the normal deference that is afforded to
companies regarding the management of their own internal
affairs.153 Though speaking about a different employment issue,
Judge Frank Easterbrook observed that in some sense,
“[e]verything the employer does is ‘integral’ to its business—why
else do it?” 154 As one employment practitioner advocating for the
mandatory submission of the business judgment rule jury
instruction in all employment discrimination cases states, it must
be clear to a “jury that the employer cannot be liable for exercising
its business judgment—even if harsh, unreasonable, or
irrational—provided
the
employer’s
reasons
were
not
discriminatory” under the specific categories protected by state
and federal antidiscrimination law. 155
In fact, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]he
business necessity standard is more lenient for the employer than
the statutory BFOQ defense.” 156 Employers are generally allowed
to utilize an employment practice that may have a disparate
impact if the employer can demonstrate its belief that the practice
is related to job performance.157 Courts will consider the cost and
other burdens of a proposed alternative to a challenged practice in
determining whether the alternative “would be equally as effective
as the challenged practice in serving the employer’s legitimate
business goals.” 158 Further, the Supreme Court has forthrightly
acknowledged that “[i]n evaluating claims that discretionary
153. But cf., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 (“consideration shall be given to the
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential”) (emphasis
added). Under the ADA, only consideration, but not deference is afforded to
an employer regarding what is an essential job function. See id.
154. Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1541
(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
155. Robert L. Ortbals, Jr., The Case for A Business Judgment Instruction
Under the Missouri Human Rights Act, 64 J. MO. B. 182, 184 (2008).
156. In fact, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]he business
necessity standard is more lenient for the employer than the statutory BFOQ
defense.” Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers
of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991).
157. See James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, What constitutes "business
necessity" justifying employment practice prima facie discriminatory under
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), 36 A.L.R.
FED. 9. The employer is not required to actually prove that the particular
criteria will predict actual on-the-job performance. Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988).
158. Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
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employment practices are insufficiently related to legitimate
business purposes, it must be borne in mind that courts are
generally less competent than employers to restructure business
practices and therefore should not attempt to do so.” 159
This deference should largely be extended to how employers
define what is the essence of their business, which is the first step
in both BFOQ and business necessity analyses. One of the most
significant cases of a court analyzing the essence of an employer’s
business is Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co. 160 The case
represents what I suggest is the danger of courts trying to define
the essence of an employer’s business. In Wilson, over one
hundred men sued Southwest Airlines because the company
openly refused to hire men for the high-customer contact positions
of flight attendant and ticket agent. 161 Despite acknowledging
that “[t]he evidence was undisputed that Southwest’s unique,
feminized image played and continues to play an important role in
the airline’s success,” the court ultimately rejected Southwest’s
“assertion that its females-only hiring policy is necessary for the
continued success of its image and its business.” 162 Providing its
own determination of the essence of Southwest’s business, the
court stated that, “[l]ike any other airline, Southwest’s primary
function is to transport passengers safely and quickly from one
point to another.” 163
Although not entirely foreclosing the potential validity of an
argument based on customer preferences, the court asserted that
“customer preference could be taken into account only when it is
based on the company’s inability to perform the primary function
or service it offers.” 164 Such extreme subordination of the
159. Id. at 999 (citing Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978)).
160. 517 F. Supp. 292, 293 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (analyzing the essence of
company’s business for purposes of a BFOQ defense).
161. Id. at 295.
162. Id. (emphasis added). In an act of desperation, Southwest hired an
advertising agency, Bloom Agency, to distinguish the company from its
competitors. Id. at 294. Bloom came up with a “Love” campaign, which
sought to differentiate Southwest from the traditional conservative airline
image by projecting Southwest as the “personification of feminine youth and
vitality.” Id.
163. Id. at 302.
164. Id. at 301 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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importance of customer preference runs afoul of one of the core
principles of managerial philosophy summarized by the legendary
management guru Peter Drucker, who stated aptly that: “The
purpose of a business is to create a customer.” 165 Further, when
courts try to impose their own view of a company’s business onto
that employer, they create artificial and often inaccurate
constraints.166
While Southwest was ultimately able to remain successful in
the aftermath of the Wilson case, albeit with a reworking of its
previous “Love” marketing scheme, had the suit come only a few
years prior, the company’s outcome would have been entirely
different. 167 As the Wilson court acknowledged, Southwest had
been incorporated in 1967 and spent the first years of its corporate
existence trying to combat legal challenges by its competitors to
its entry into the Texas intrastate market.168 “In December of
165. PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: ECONOMIC TASKS AND
RISK-TAKING DECISIONS 117 (1964). See Theodore Levitt, Marketing Myopia, 1
HARV. BUS. REV. 1, 19 (1960) (arguing that businesses will do better in the
end if they concentrate on meeting customers’ needs rather than focusing on
selling products). In contrast, some argue that too much deference to
customers would be against public policy. See Rhode, supra note 40, at 1065.
Rhode asserts that Southern employers in the early civil rights era argued
that hiring black employees would be bad for business because it would scare
away other customers. Id. However, comparing the recognition of aesthetics
as a valuable characteristic to the grotesque racism of the post-Civil War
south is setting up a straw-man whose very establishment borders on
offensive. See id. (comparing the hiring practices of Hooters and Southwest
Airlines to the systematic refusal to hire blacks in the south after the Civil
War).
166. See Corbett, supra note 11, at 647. In describing the Wilson case,
Corbett notes that “[s]ome businesses build attractive individuals into their
business identity . . . though the court rejected that argument as a matter of
law, it was true as a matter of fact.” Id. (emphasis added). Additionally,
most modern corporations are granted incorporation for intentionally vague
business purposes, such as for “any lawful business.” Angela Schneeman,
“Chapter 8: Incorporations,” THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS, at 315 (2012). Thus, in so far as a statement of corporate
purpose is to inform the public of the essence of the corporation’s business,
the public should be deemed on notice that a given corporation could be
engaged in any business. See id.
167. Ironically (or perhaps fortunately) it was the same maverick, neversurrender corporate personality that led Southwest to adopt its “Love”
campaign that allowed the company to succeed after the fact. See KEVIN
FREIBERG & JACKIE FREIBERG, NUTS! SOUTHWEST AIRLINES’ CRAZY RECIPE FOR
BUSINESS AND PERSONAL SUCCESS 36–40 (1996).
168. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 293.

PAGLIARINIFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

IT CAN’T GET THAT UGLY

3/2/2014 2:05 PM

305

1970, Southwest had $143 in the bank and was over $100,000 in
debt, though no aircraft had ever left the ground.” 169 The
introduction of the “Love” campaign was, Southwest admits, in
part an act of “desperation.” 170 However, it was a carefully
calculated act to attract the type of customers that predominated
the Texas intrastate market and who otherwise would travel with
competitors. 171 Indeed, Southwest’s hiring decisions were, for all
practical purposes, a necessity for the business to succeed at the
time. However, if the plaintiffs in Wilson had filed suit merely
nine years prior, there is a significant likelihood that the company
might not have been able overcome the burden that ruling would
have then imposed. 172
Additionally, while Wilson dealt with sex and accompanying
sex appeal in the context of BFOQ for airline attendants and
ticket agents, the court’s analysis of the proper weight to be
afforded to customer preference and its imposed definition of
business essence are alarming. 173 From a practical standpoint,
would (and should) an employer first have to hire an individual
and then wait for a particular negative outcome to occur before
being able to be free to shape its hiring based on business
necessity or BFOQ? 174 For example, in Craft v. Metromedia, Inc.,
a woman was hired to be a co-anchor for a television news
program. 175 Obviously, based on the fact that the company hired
her, the company believed the anchor to be qualified. However,
after almost half a year on the air, the company conducted follow169. Id. at 294.
170. FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra note 167, at 38.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 296 (indicating that the plaintiffs had filed suit prior to
August 1980).
173. Cf. Gregory J. Kramer & Edwin A. Keller, Jr. Give Me $5 Chips, a
Jack and Coke—Hold the Cleavage: A Look at Employee Issues in the Gaming
Industry, 7 GAMING L. REV. 335, 341 (2003) (discussing Hooters’ settlement
with the EEOC to create gender-neutral positions at its restaurants after its
practice of restricting the position of “Hooters Girls” to females was
challenged and Hooters argued that being female was a BFOQ for the
position).
174. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981)
(employer not justified in rejecting promotion of woman to position based on
fact that Latin American and Southeast Customers were reluctant to do
business with a woman).
175. 766 F.2d 1205, 1208 (8th Cir. 1985).
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up research to evaluate how the news station’s audience was
responding to the anchor’s performance. 176 The response to the
anchor’s appearance was “overwhelmingly negative” and the
company subsequently moved the anchor to a different, off-air
position, though with the same pay and benefits. 177 As part of its
reasoning rejecting the anchor’s claims of discrimination on the
basis of sex, the court noted that the company’s “reasonable
appearance requirements were ‘obviously critical’ to [the
company’s] economic well-being.” 178
One has to wonder: if the Craft plaintiff’s claim had been a
pure aesthetic-based claim (presuming such a law were put in
place), would the employer have had to wait until the plaintiff was
unable to perform to the satisfaction of the audience, or would the
employer have been empowered to exercise its judgment and
determine that a more aesthetically pleasing anchor would be
necessary to meet the demands of its audience? Provided
compliance with all other antidiscrimination laws, based on the
above scenario, I submit that it would be illogical to restrict an
employer from exercising its judgment as to a potential employee’s
ability to perform based on aesthetics, ex ante, when the
employer—as the Eighth Circuit found—is perfectly justified in
making that same decision, ex post.
Indeed, while some
commentators suggest that a focus on aesthetics can contribute to
inefficiencies in the workforce, 179 the above scenario shows how
not empowering employers to discriminate (i.e. consider) on the
basis of aesthetics undoubtedly would be tremendously inefficient.
PART III

While I have argued that aesthetics should be a legitimate
hiring criterion (across all fields and positions, not just “looks”
positions) and that, like all other legitimate hiring criteria, the
particular value, weight, and amount of consideration that
176. Id. at 1208–09. This was done through “focus group” discussions
moderated by a company representative. Id. at 1209.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1215. The court also acknowledged that the “evidence shows a
consistent concern by management over the appearance of all on-air
personnel without regard to sex but with regard to the peculiar
characteristics of each employee.” Id. at 1213, n. 7.
179. See, e.g., Gumin, supra note 10, at 1774.
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aesthetics should be afforded should largely be at the sole
discretion and prerogative of employers, I do acknowledge the
potential hazards of giving an employer complete and total
unfettered discretion over all decisions in the employment
context.180
Even if many employees are not aware of this fact, 181 the
default rule in 49 out of 50 states is that all employment is at-will,
wherein either party can terminate the relationship “for a good
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.” 182 However, the
significant caveat to that presumption is that the reason for the
employer terminating the relationship cannot be one that violates
local, state, or federal law. 183 Additionally, while the at-will
doctrine is at times justified by its promotion of symmetry in the
employment context (i.e. both the employer and the employee are
at least theoretically on equal footing), 184 the doctrine cannot be
analyzed outside of its practical import, and, at times, the
relatively unequal balance of power between employers and their
employees. In turn, by recognizing aesthetics as a legitimate
employment criterion, a blind eye need not be turned to the
manner in which employers take action based on that criterion.
Desiring individuals with certain qualities (e.g. naturally
180. For a provocative, yet well-articulated piece that, as the title
suggests, takes issue with the whole concept of antidiscrimination laws, see
Richard A. Epstein, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). Epstein’s work is infused with his strong
libertarian views and draws from the Lockean labor theory wherein
individuals, as the exclusive owner of their own labor, should be free to utilize
that labor as he or she sees fit. See id. at 20–58; see also, John J. Donohue
III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law,
44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1590 (1992) (arguing that an unregulated market will
actually eliminate discrimination).
181. See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their
Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U.L. REV. 6, 7 (2002) (explaining
that most employees are not aware that they are employees-at-will and
terminable without cause).
182. Corbett, supra note 11, at 656. “Therefore, in every U.S. state except
Montana, an employer does not have to offer good cause for termination
unless the employee claims that the reason for termination constitutes a
breach of contract, amounts to a tort, or violates a statute.” Id.
183. Id. Further, many recognize that there have been significant inroads
over the years into the at-will doctrine that prevent employers from truly
exercising complete control over employees. Id. at 657–58.
184. See, e.g., Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Wis.
1967).
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blonde hair, blue eyes) could clearly have an inherently disparate
impact against certain protected classes under Title VII. Further,
allowing unfettered deference to an employer’s aesthetic
preferences could provide a backdoor way to unlawfully
discriminate against protected classes. For example, an employer
could try to assert that they honestly preferred the attractiveness
of a particular race (or conversely, did not find a particular race
attractive). However, irrespective of the honesty of the employer’s
personal preference, such discrimination would nonetheless run
afoul of Title VII because it would be illegal discrimination on the
basis of race. 185 Additionally, under such circumstances said
employer would not be able to avail itself of a BFOQ defense. 186
Proponents of an aesthetic antidiscrimination law argue that
aesthetic discrimination can compound existing inequalities
already suffered by protected classes.187 One argument is that
perceptions of what constitutes attractiveness are in part shaped
by our surrounding culture and environment. 188 Accordingly, the
argument follows that allowing employers to consider aesthetics
will simply condone the imposition of the majority’s view of
attractiveness.189 Thus, in an effort to gain acceptance (i.e.
employment), members of the non-majority will be forced to
“assimilate to dominant norms.” 190 The exertion of such pressure
could undoubtedly have adverse societal consequences, especially
if an employer—like the one described in the paragraph above—
imposed its attractiveness standards to exclude protected
classes. 191
Yet, even if aesthetics is treated as a legitimate hiring
185. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et. seq.
186. Congress has not provided a BFOQ defense for discrimination on the
basis of race.
187. See Rhode, supra note 40, at 1052.
188. Ritu Mahajan, Comment, The Naked Truth: Appearance
Discrimination, Employment, and the Law, 14 ASIAN AM. L.J. 165, 167 (2007).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 174.
191. It is also important to highlight that similar arguments are raised in
regard to standards of intelligence. See Roy Freedle, How and Why
Standardized Tests Systematically Underestimate African-Americans' True
Verbal Ability and What to Do About It: Towards the Promotion of Two New
Theories with Practical Applications, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183, 187 (2006).
Freedle argues that standardized tests, including conventional intelligent
quotient (IQ) tests, are biased against certain groups of minorities. Id.
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criterion, the situation cannot get that ugly. By ensuring robust
enforcement of the current statutory and common law protections,
an appropriate balance can be struck that will be beneficial to
both employees and employers.192 Criticism that, if aesthetics
was a completely valid criterion, then it would be difficult for
employees to show that the particular aesthetic standard had a
discriminatory impact, is largely a criticism of the general
difficulties of proof that all plaintiff-employees have to bear in
employment discrimination cases.193
However, opening up aesthetics as a legitimate hiring
criterion could actually improve societal acceptance and norms by
making employers see the aesthetic value that can transcend all
protected classes. Even one of the staunchest proponents of
aesthetic antidiscrimination protection notes:
[T]he globalization of mass media and information
technology has brought an increasing convergence in
standards of attractiveness.
Researchers on appearance have achieved a substantial
measure of reliability through a “truth in consensus”
method. In essence, subjects rate a photograph or an
individual on a scale of attractiveness, and those ratings
are then averaged to produce an overall assessment.
Such methods yield a strikingly high degree of consensus
even among individuals of different sex, race, age,
socioeconomic status, and cultural backgrounds.194
This suggests a certain amount of objectivity in the evaluation
192. In fact, this is what occurred in the Abercombie & Fitch cases. See
Lawrence E. Dube. Court Sends Religious Bias Case to Trial: Employee Quit
Over Retailer's “Look Policy,” [2009] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 211, at A-6
(Nov. 4, 2009) (discussing EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No.
4:08CV1470 JCH, 2009 WL 3517578 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009)). Thus, this
shows that there are undoubtedly some benefits that have occurred because
of lawsuits by some plaintiffs.
See id.
Abercombie still hires for
attractiveness, but does so through a very thorough diversity policy. Id.
193. See e.g., Mahajan, supra note 188, at 177–80.
194. Rhode, supra note 40, at 1036 (citing LINDA A. JACKSON, PHYSICAL
APPEARANCE
AND
GENDER:
SOCIOBIOLOGICAL
AND
SOCIOCULTURAL
PERSPECTIVES 4 (1992)(empahsis added); Patzer, supra note 122, at 5; Vicki
Ritts, Miles Patterson & Mark E. Tubbs, Expectations, Impressions, and
Judgments of Physically Attractive Students: A Review, 62 REV. EDUC. RES.
413, 414 (1992).
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of aesthetics. Of course, there will always be a degree of
subjectivity in such an evaluation. However, just as there are
different types of intelligence (e.g. logical-mathematical, linguistic,
musical, etc.), 195 there are different types of features and
characteristics that can be aesthetically pleasing (e.g. charming
smile, clear skin). Just as all types of intelligence should be
afforded their respective praise, so too should different types of
aesthetic characteristics.
Giving full recognition to aesthetics as a legitimate
employment criterion can inure to the benefit of employees by
allowing individuals to extract a proper wage premium based on
this characteristic and also to promote the celebration of aesthetic
value across all protected classes. Additionally, employers will
benefit by being more empowered to utilize the value of aesthetics
for the benefit of their business. By being upfront and candid
about their intent to take an employee’s aesthetics into
consideration, there will be less opportunity for employers to be
sued under purely aesthetic-based claims. 196 Further, by
informing employees that aesthetics is a legitimate criterion that
will be taken into account, employers will be in a better position to
protect themselves against retaliation claims. 197 Indeed, under
antiretaliation provisions, a plaintiff does not necessarily have to
succeed on the underlying discrimination claim in order to
successfully pursue a retaliation claim.198 A plaintiff need only
establish a reasonable, good-faith belief that the employer’s action
violated either Title VII or the ADEA. 199 Thus, by recognizing the
legitimacy of aesthetics as a valid criterion and then engaging in
an effort to discuss how aesthetics will be taken into account on a
195. See generally HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF
MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (2011). Indeed, between a mechanic that can fix
anything in an automobile, a physician that can perform any surgery, a
singer that can hit any note, a mathematician that can balance any
equation—(and the list goes on )—is there really a truly objective measure of
which is the most intelligent feat?
196. See supra Part I.
197. See Corbett, supra note 11, at 649–51. Under anti-retaliation
clauses, retaliation claims are demonstrated by showing that the employee
engaged in a protected activity, that the employer took adverse employment
action against the employee, and that there is a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse action. Id.
198. Id. at 650.
199. Id.
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non-discriminatory, even-handed manner, employers can more
adequately protect themselves from retaliation claims.
Further, such upfront discussion about the role aesthetics will
play in the work environment can allow for a more candid and
honest exchange between employers and employees. This can also
inure to the benefit of employees that may be discharged for a
purely aesthetic reason. Instead of forcing an employer to conjure
up evidence to justify its decision, an employer’s ability to take
adverse employment action on the basis of aesthetics can reduce
the amount of pretextual reasons the employer may otherwise
give. 200 For example, the recent case of Nelson v. James H. Knight
DDS, P.C., highlights a perfect example of aesthetics playing a
legitimate role in the employment context. 201 Although the Iowa
Supreme Court altered its rationale with the superseding opinion
of Nelson II, the underlying facts remained the same, providing an
interesting example of someone fired for being too attractive, not
for being too unattractive. 202 In Nelson I, a male dentist hired a
200. See Rhode, supra note 40, at 1069 (discussing employers’ reluctance
to acknowledge unattractiveness as reason for employment action).
201. No. 11-1857, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5 (Iowa Dec. 21, 2012)
(hereinafter Nelson I), withdrawn and superseded on rehearing by 834
N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013) (hereinafter Nelson II). The Iowa Supreme Court
granted rehearing and issued a superseding opinion in the case. Although, as
Todd Pettys, Associate Dean at the University of Iowa College of Law notes,
“[i]t’s still not clear . . . exactly why the court agreed to rehear the case.” O.
Kay Henderson, U-of-I Law Professor: Court’s Second Ruling on “Too
Attractive” Case “Curious”, RADIO IOWA (July 12, 2013), http://www.radioiowa
.com/2013/07/12/u-of-i-law-professor-courts-second-ruling-on-too-attractivecase-curious. Indeed, as Dean Pettys points out, “[n]one of the justices
changed their vote.” Id. However, one must suspect that the justices—being
in a judicial election state—knew all too well the dangers of issuing an
unpopular decision. See O. Kay Henderson, National Report Tracks Spending
in Iowa’s 2012 Judicial Retention Election, RADIO IOWA (Oct. 24, 2013),
http://www.radioiowa.com/2013/10/24/national-report-tracks-spending-iniowas-2012-judicial-retention-election/ (discussing that three justices of the
Iowa Supreme Court were voted off the bench as part of backlash from a
decision legalizing same-sex marriage in Iowa).
202. Nelson I, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5. Unfortunately, in Nelson II, the
Iowa Supreme Court retreated from the simple and straightforward rationale
of its previous opinion, by focusing on the dentist’s wife’s discontent with the
nature of the relationship between the dentist and the assistant. 834 N.W.2d
at 72. The majority, in dicta, suggested that it would be impermissible sex
discrimination to take employment action “based on stereotypes related to
the characteristics of . . . gender, including attributes of attractiveness.” Id.
at 77. In his concurrence, Chief Justice Mark Cady went so far as to suggest
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female dental assistant (the plaintiff). 203 The assistant worked for
the dentist for over ten-and-a-half years, and, while the dentist
had complained on several occasions that the assistant’s “clothing
was too tight and revealing and ‘distracting,’” the dentist admitted
that she “had not done anything wrong or inappropriate and that
she was the best dental assistant he ever had.” 204 Similarly,
although the dentist had engaged in a few conversations via text
and in-person that contained sexual content, the assistant
admitted that the dentist “generally treated her with respect, and
she believed him to be a person of high integrity . . . [whom she]
considered [ ] to be a friend and father figure.” 205 There was no
allegation of sexual harassment in the case. However, the dentist
fired the assistant, at his wife’s request, because “he feared he
would try to have an affair with her down the road if he did not
In short, the dentist found the assistant too
fire her.” 206
attractive. However, rather than lie about the job performance of
the “best dental assistant he ever had,” the dentist could be
upfront about his concern. In future cases, employers could utilize
this reasoning and be upfront about aesthetic concerns to ensure
there are no retaliation claims and no need to resort to pre-textual
firing.207
Proponents of aesthetic antidiscrimination protection argue
that there are tremendously dangerous costs to both society and
individuals that are associated with the obsession and pursuit of
attractiveness.208
They argue, citing numerous studies and
statistics, that obsession with appearance can lead to anxiety, low
that, even in the absence of gender stereotyping, “an employer cannot legally
fire an employee simply because the employer finds the employee too
attractive or not attractive enough.” Id. (Cady, C.J., specially concurring).
203. Nelson I, 2012 WL 6652747, at *1.
204. Id. at *1–*2.
205. Id. at *1.
206. Id. at *2. The court noted that the dentist hired another female for
the position. Id.
207. It is important to note that while the dentist in Nelson I may have
been sexually attracted to the assistant, recognition of someone as
aesthetically pleasing does not in any way have to be coextensive with a
sexual desire. Individuals can recognize someone as aesthetically pleasing,
like a work of art, without having to be sexually attracted to him or her. But
see Nelson II, 834 N.W.2d at 77 (Cady, C.J., specially concurring) (suggesting
that any decision based on attractiveness would be impermissible sex
discrimination).
208. Rhode, supra note 40, at 1035–47.

PAGLIARINIFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/2/2014 2:05 PM

IT CAN’T GET THAT UGLY

313

self-esteem, and other psychological disorders, including
depression.209 Further, they point out the exorbitant sums of
money that individuals spend on improving their appearances and
the vast amount of time that is wasted in such pursuits. 210 But is
preoccupation with intelligence any better? Take an example that
is close to home. The competitive environment that surrounds law
schools is well known. However, probably less well known is that:
While students enter law school suffering from clinical
stress and depression at a rate that mirrors the national
average . . . during the first year of law school [] [s]tudies
have shown that law students suffer from clinical stress
and depression at a rate that is three to four times higher
than the national average . . . [and] that student stress
rises steadily through the third year of law school. 211
Yet, obsession with intelligence and academic performance to
the point of developing unhealthy stress and other harmful
consequences can begin, and often does, well before graduate
school.212 Though more thorough studies are needed, some
estimates from doctors and students at high schools with high
performance standards suggest that between 15 to 40 percent of
students abuse amphetamines, like Adderall, as study aids
without a prescription. 213 Abuse of such drugs can lead to
depression, heart problems, and, for many, a path to addiction to
harder substances like Percocet, OxyContin, and even heroin.214
Additionally, the exponentially increasing amount of student debt
racked up in pursuit of education has a profoundly negative
impact not only on individual students, but on society as a
whole.215
209. Id. at 1040 and accompanying notes.
210. Id. at 1041–42 and accompanying notes.
211. HERBERT N. RAMY, SUCCEEDING IN LAW SCHOOL 29 (2006) (citing
Stephen B. Shanfield & G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Psychiatric Distress in Law
Students, 35 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 65 n. 1 (1985)).
212. Alan Schwarz, Risky Rise of the Good-Grade Pill, NEW YORK TIMES,
June 9, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/
education/seeking-academic-edge-teenagers-abuse-s.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Charles M. Blow, A Dangerous “New Normal” in College Debt,
NYTIMES.COM, Mar. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013
/03/09/opinion/blow-a-dangerous-new-normal-in-college-debt.html?_r=0; John
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CONCLUSION

It is clear that there are dangers associated with obsession
and blind pursuit of both attractiveness and intelligence.
However, research shows that either characteristic can positively
impact one’s ability to succeed in life. 216 Yet, many of the
proponents of aesthetic antidiscrimination protection can take
solace in studies whose findings suggest that “the brainy are not
necessarily at a disadvantage to the beautiful.” 217 What this
comment has sought to demonstrate is that both mind
(intelligence) and body (aesthetics) should be considered relevant
criteria for employment purposes. Both characteristics are—for
better or for worse—partly controlled by the great birth lottery of
luck. It is also important to remember that individuals do not
necessarily remain what society may consider unattractive 218 or
unintelligent 219 throughout life. Still, we should all take note that
irrespective of one’s attractiveness or intelligence, a high degree of
confidence and self-worth can provide the same degree of
success—at least
financially speaking—as
the
lauded
characteristics of attractiveness and intelligence. 220
At the end of the day, employers should feel empowered to
take an entirely holistic view of an employee into consideration in
order to make decisions regarding the employee’s actual and
perceived value to the company. Individuals should recognize that
there is a difference between someone’s intrinsic value as a human
being 221 versus their value to the particular demands of an
Hechinger, Overdue Student Loans Reach Record as U.S. Graduates Seek
Jobs, BLOOMBERG.COM, May 23, 2013, http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2013-05-23/overdue-student-loans-reach-record-as-u-s-graduatesseek-jobs.html.
216. See Judge et. al., supra note 99, at 749.
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., James Harris, The Best Celebrity Yearbook Photos: George
Clooney, COMPLEXSTYLE, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.complex.com/style/
2013/02/the-50-best-celebrity-yearbook-photos/george-clooney.
219. See, e.g., Biography: Richard Branson, BIO.COM, http://www.
biography.com/people/richard-branson-9224520.
220. See Judge et. al, supra note 99, at 749.
221. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS
30, (James W. Ellington trans. 1785) (1993) (stating Kant’s second categorical
imperative: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end,
but always at the same time as an end.”).
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employer. Additionally, while an employer should be empowered
to take both aesthetics and intelligence into account, the employer
should still be respectful regarding their evaluations of employees.
It is a misconception to assume that an employer cannot demand
high, exacting standards from employees and still treat them with
respect. 222 And, if we recognize all of the different types of value
individuals can bring to the workforce and encourage and enforce
that respect for all employees, it indeed will not get that ugly.

222. See, e.g, FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra note 167, at 315. “It’s very
important to value people as individuals, not just employees . . . I don’t use
the word employees very much, and I never use the word management. I just
refer to the people of Southwest Airlines, and we really try to treat them as
people and recognize each one’s individuality,” said Herb Kelleher, the former
CEO of Southwest Airlines, whose policy of hiring attractive airline
attendants many aesthetic antidiscrimination proponents have harshly
criticized. Id.

